Censorship Measurement Studies
We list measurement studies looking at the operation of censors. We list the study findings that are key from the prospective of our study. The studies may contain other findings as well.
| Study Subject | Key Findings |
|---|---|
| [ref] | |
| [ref] | |
| [ref] | |
| [ref] | |
| 11 countries 2012 [ref] | Stateful |
| 33 countries 2011 [ref] | DNS injection |
| 77 Countries 2007--2012 [ref] | |
| China 2002 [ref] | Stateless; censorship is not centralized; 9.3\% (18,931) sites were inaccessible |
| China 2004--2005 [ref] | |
| China 2005 [ref] | TCP RST injection; Stateless |
| China 2006 [ref] | |
| China 2007 [ref] | Stateful |
| China 2007 [ref] | DNS injection |
| China 2008--2009 [ref] | TCP RST injection |
| China 2011 [ref] | |
| China 2012 [ref] | |
| China 2012 [ref] | |
| China 2013 [ref] | Stateful; Packet reassembly |
| China 2014 [ref] | |
| China 2014 [ref] | DNS injection |
| China 2014 [ref] | |
| China 2015 [ref] | Packet dropping |
| Egypt and Libya 2011 [ref] | |
| Germany 2001--2003 [ref] | |
| Iran 2009 [ref] | |
| Iran 2013 [ref] | DNS injection; Packet dropping |
| Iran 2013 [ref] | |
| Pakistan 2013 [ref] | DNS injection; HTTP injection |
| Pakistan 2013 [ref] | Using Netsweeper |
| Syria 2011 [ref] | Using Blue Coat |
| Turkey 2007 [ref] | |
| Turkey, Russia 2014 [ref] | |
| UK 2004 [ref] | |
| Worldwide 2012--2013 [ref] | |
| Worldwide 2013 [ref] | Using Netsweeper (Qatar 2013, UEA 2013, Yeman 2013); Using Blue Coat (Burma 2011, UAE 2013, Qatar 2013); Using SmartFilter (Qatar 2013, Saudi Arabia 2012, UAE 2013) |